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Guide · OSNMA and meaconing

Galileo OSNMA vs meaconing: why signal authentication does not stop replay

Short answer

Galileo OSNMA cannot stop meaconing. OSNMA proves a navigation message came from a Galileo satellite, and a meaconed message did come from one, so it is reported as authentic. OSNMA stops forged data, not replayed data. Detecting meaconing needs an independent reference such as inertial, visual or terrain-based navigation.

Updated · Sources listed below

What OSNMA is

OSNMA, Galileo's Open Service Navigation Message Authentication, adds a cryptographic signature to the open-service navigation messages. A receiver can check the signature and confirm the data was generated by Galileo, which defeats an attacker who fabricates navigation messages.

What meaconing does

The term comes from “masking beacons”, a Second World War tactic of re-radiating radio beacons to mislead bomber crews. In a modern attack:

  1. A receiving antenna captures real signals from the GNSS satellites in view.
  2. The meaconer amplifies and rebroadcasts them, live with a short delay or recorded for later.
  3. Nearby receivers lock onto the louder copy. Every message is genuine, so integrity and authentication checks pass.
  4. The receiver computes the position and time of the attacker's antenna, plus the delay.

For a beginner-friendly deep dive on the attack itself, see our sister site meaconing.com.

Why authentication cannot catch a replay

The signature proves where a message came from, not where or when the signal was received. A replayed message did come from a Galileo satellite, so it verifies. In published field tests, an OSNMA-enabled receiver reported meaconed signals as authentic (Inside GNSS, “OSNMA: Necessary But Not Sufficient”).

AttackDoes OSNMA stop it?Why
JammingNoNo signal arrives to authenticate
Spoofing with forged dataYesForged messages fail signature checks
Meaconing (replay)NoThe data is genuine and correctly signed

What does help

Defeating meaconing requires an independent reference that does not come from the sky. Comparing GNSS against the terrain beneath the vehicle, camera imagery or measured inertial motion exposes a position that does not match the ground. Practical signs include a position that matches a fixed ground location, unexplained receiver clock jumps, and all satellites arriving with the same extra delay or from one direction. See navigating without GPS and GPS spoofing.

Frequently asked questions

Can Galileo OSNMA authentication stop meaconing?

No. OSNMA verifies that a navigation message came from a Galileo satellite. A replayed message did come from one, so it is reported as authentic.

What is the difference between meaconing and spoofing?

Spoofing transmits counterfeit GNSS signals generated by the attacker. Meaconing retransmits real signals captured from the satellites. Because meaconed signals carry authentic data, they pass checks that can reveal ordinary spoofing.

What does OSNMA protect against?

OSNMA protects against forged Galileo navigation messages. It does not protect against jamming or replayed signals.

How can you detect meaconing?

Signs include a position that matches a fixed ground location, unexplained receiver clock jumps, and every satellite arriving with the same extra delay or from the same direction. The most reliable test is to cross-check GNSS against a navigation source that does not depend on satellites.

Related guides

Sources

  1. Inside GNSS, OSNMA: necessary but not sufficient
  2. NAVIGATION (ION), Multipath under meaconing
  3. arXiv, Relaying and replaying of GNSS signals
  4. Stanford GPS Lab, Observations of spoofing (ION ITM 2026)